I. Introduction and Motivation
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 added Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 162(m) limiting corporate tax deductions for executive compensation. This provision was designed to curb executive compensation in response to the growing concern about the perceived link between the international competitiveness of United States industry and the substantial salaries paid to United States executives (Brownstein and Panner 1992) . Critics of executive pay (see for example Crystal 1992 , McCarroll 1993 argued that it was excessive, both in comparison to that paid lower level employees and that paid overseas executives; and that executives were setting their own pay with no shareholder input.
Congress believed that section 162(m) would reduce excessive, non-performance based compensation (U.S. Congress, House 1993) .
With the intent of reducing such compensation and/or making it more responsive to firm performance, this IRC section limited the corporate tax deduction for executive compensation to $1 million per individual but provided an exception for excess compensation that is based on performance schemes pre-approved by shareholders. Given the fact that this IRC provision was enacted to engineer social policy; specifically, to affect corporate executive compensation policy, the obvious issue is: has it done so? For example, has executive pay decreased since 1993? The answer appears to be no. Surveys and studies document that CEO compensation has risen substantially since the enactment of section 162(m). (E.g. Lublin 2003 , Balsam 2002 , Perry and Zenner 2001 . These studies, however, did not distinguish between the compensation of executives hired after the imposition of section 162(m) from those already in place. Materially changing the compensation package of executives to conform to IRC section 162(m) will provide benefits to the firm (e.g., tax savings from claiming the compensation deduction), but may mean a significant shift in the inherent risk of the executive's compensation package. Consequently firms and executives may be reluctant to make the change.
1 On the other hand, firms may be willing and better able to adapt the executive compensation package when hiring new executives. In this paper, we focus our analysis on this latter group of executives. This paper continues in Section 2 with a discussion of section 162(m) and the results of studies and surveys on the efficacy of section 162(m). Section 3 discusses the model and our expectations, while section 4 discusses our sample and data. The empirical results are reported in section 5 and the conclusions are in section 6.
II. IRC section 162(m)
Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) places a $1 million cap on the annual deduction for compensation to the chief executive officer (CEO) and the next four highest compensated officers. Executive compensation generally consists of salary, fringe benefits, annual cash incentives, and long-term cash or stock-based incentives. The section 162(m) limit does not apply to (1) commissions, (2) non-taxable fringes and qualified retirement plan contributions, and (3) performance-based compensation.
1 Balsam and Ryan (1996) examined the propensity of firms to conform their short-term bonus plans to the section 162(m) requirements. They find approximately half of the firms in their sample chose not to modify their executive compensation schemes, and that many of those that did qualify expressly stated that they reserved their right to pay nondeductible compensation. Consistent with the latter, Balsam and Yin (2005) examine the deductibility of compensation under section 162(m) finding that many firms forfeit deductions even though they qualify one or more compensation plans.
Prior to the imposition of section 162(m), most companies professed to tie short-and long-term incentive compensation to performance; however, compensation committees had substantial discretion in awarding compensation. To qualify for the performance-based exception under section 162(m), companies must develop a performance-based compensation plan that is based on the executive's attainment of one or more performance goals that were established ex-ante by a compensation committee composed of independent directors. The performance goals must be based on objective formulae and the material terms of the plan must be disclosed to and approved by shareholders. The compensation committee, which has the discretion to award less, but not more than the objectively determined amount, must certify that the performance goals have been met before payment is made. Any compensation awarded by the committee based on discretionary assessments of performance in excess of the objectively determined amounts is not deductible on the corporate tax return.
By definition, salary will not qualify as performance-based since it is not contingent on the attainment of any criteria. Thus, any salary amounts earned in excess of the cap are not deductible unless payment is deferred until after the executive's retirement. Annual cash bonuses will qualify under the performance based exception as long as the firm adopts and adheres to a bonus plan consistent with the section 162(m) requirements discussed above. Similarly, long-term compensation in the form of restricted stock awards will qualify only if it is granted as a result of attaining performance goals. Under 162(m), an employer can condition the grant of restricted stock on achievement of performance goals, or the employer can grant restricted stock with vesting contingent of performance goals. On the other hand, long-term compensation in the form of stock options easily qualifies as performance-based under the regulations as long as the options have exercise prices equal to or greater than the market price at the time the award is made and the plan states the maximum number of shares that can be granted during a specified period. Thus, the compensation committee still has considerable discretion in awarding stock option compensation.
There is ample evidence that IRC section 162(m) has not had the intended impact on firm behavior. Research has shown that CEO compensation has risen, on average, post section 162(m). Perry and Zenner (2001) document increases in all components of the compensation package after 1993, with the largest increase in performance related components (bonus and stock option grants). They also document that more than half of the CEOs earning a salary in excess of the million dollar cap from 1992 to 1997 received a salary increase in the subsequent year. Balsam (2002) provides a lengthy discussion of the change in magnitude and composition of the CEO compensation package using data from the Execucomp database. He also shows that all components of CEO compensation have increased dramatically in the 1990s and notes that "… mean (median) total compensation increased from $1,689,000 ($997,000) in 1992 to $8,466,000 ($3,188,000) in 2000, an increase of 401% (220%)" (Balsam 2002, 49 (Lublin 2003, B1) . Perhaps most interestingly, Harris and Livingstone (2002) examined firms whose CEOs earned less than $1 million, the "unaffected firms", and found section 162(m) had the perverse effect, because it set a target, of raising the compensation of those CEOs.
It seems clear that research and anecdotal reports show that section 162(m) has not lead to a reduction in executive compensation. While the 162(m) legislation clearly had its roots in concerns about excessive compensation paid to top corporate executives, the final legislation allowed the exception for compensation tied to performance. Thus, while overall executive compensation has continued to increase, an important question is whether it has become more sensitive to company performance. The extant research provides contradictory evidence on this question. Perry and Zenner (2001) report an increased sensitivity of compensation to performance after 1993. They conclude (478), "there is a stronger relation between bonus payments and/or total pay and stock returns post-1993, and that this relation is significantly more pronounced for firms that are more likely to be affected by the regulations." Similarly, Rose and Wolfram (2000, 201) provide some evidence that the 162(m) limit "has led firms near the $1 million cap to restrain their salary increases and perhaps to increase the performance components of their pay packages."
However, in a later paper, Rose and Wolfram report a different result. They (2002, S138) write "There is little evidence that the policy significantly increased the performance sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay at affected firms. We conclude that corporate pay decisions have been relatively insulated from this policy intervention." Rose and Wolfram acknowledge that their results differ from earlier studies and they attribute the differences to methodological issues, including differences in how the studies have identified "affected" firms and executives; differences in the construction of samples; and differences in the specification of compensation equations.
There is also some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the 162(m) provision is ineffective.
The Wall Street Journal reported that some companies are choosing to change plans in midyear, when "it becomes clear that they won't hit the original targets." (Drucker 2004, C1) . The report cited announcements by AT&T Wireless, Cigna Corporation, Prudential
Financial, Inc., and Campbell Soup Company.
In summary, what do we know about the efficacy of section 162(m) from the extant research? First, it has not led to a reduction in CEO compensation. Second, there is contradictory evidence on whether it has increased the sensitivity of the relation between executive pay and firm performance. The purpose of this study is to address the mixed results in the literature. We focus our analysis on CEO's hired after the imposition of the section 162(m) limits. This provides a more powerful setting to examine the efficacy of section 162(m).
Why examine the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of 162(m)?
Based on inertia, and perhaps the power of the CEO relative to the Board itself, the possibility exists that the effect of section 162(m) will best be observed when a new CEO takes over and the Board has the opportunity to draw up a new contract. That is, Boards may be unable or reluctant to change the material terms of the compensation package of CEOs already in place because such changes significantly shift the inherent risk of the CEO's compensation package. Furthermore, the literature shows that CEO compensation increases with CEO tenure and decreases in the percentage of Board members who preceded the CEO on the Board (Core et al. 1999 , Main et al. 1995 , Hill and Phan 1991 , Wade et al. 1990 3 . These studies document that with increasing tenure a CEO is able to influence the Board and hence influence his or her compensation package. Under the "influence hypothesis," the CEO is said to gain influence over the Board because he or she generally nominates new Board members and, as time passes, most of the Board become loyal to the CEO.
However a new CEO would not have this "influence" over the Board. Further, there would be no shift in the inherent risk of an executive's compensation package when that executive is initially appointed. In the initial compensation negotiations, the Board has the opportunity to include performance criteria and to draft a compensation package that reflects the requirements of IRC section 162(m). We therefore posit in this study that, all else being equal, the compensation of CEOs hired after 1994 will be more responsive to firm performance than the compensation of CEOs already in place.
Determining the efficacy of section 162(m) with respect to the pay-performance relation is problematic for a number of reasons. One major issue is that each component of the compensation package may have different drivers, and firm performance may or may not be one of those drivers. To illustrate, consider how salary and stock options respond to firm-specific performance. In general, the salary component of an executive's compensation package will have upside potential, but not downside potential except in rare and unusual circumstances. While a Board will increase an executive's salary in response to improved firm performance, rarely does the Board reduce the salary in the face of deterioration in firm performance. For example, Balsam (2002) finds that 70 percent of CEOs of the poorest performing firms (i.e., firms in the lowest decile with respect to change in income) received found that CEO compensation was higher when the CEO's tenure was greater than that of the chair of the compensation committee. Hill and Phan (1991) find that the relation between the change in CEO cash compensation and stock returns weakens with tenure. Wade et al. (1990) found the greater the percentage of outside board members appointed after the CEO, the more likely the CEO will have a golden parachute. In contrast, because firms can, and many have taken steps to qualify their cash bonus plans, and doing so requires an ex-ante link between bonus and firm performance, this relationship may become stronger after section 162(m). Still, significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in the use of performance thresholds and criteria (and the allowable use of negative discretion) may make it difficult to find such a relationship 4 . Hence, any change in the compensation package of the CEO may differ across the various components as well as on whether the CEO was appointed before or after the imposition of section 162(m).
For these reasons, we examine the components of CEO compensation separately.
III. Model and Expectations
The primary focus of this study is to examine the effect of section 162(m) on newly hired CEOs in those firms affected and potentially affected by this tax law change. The form of the preexisting compensation package influences the extent to which firms are affected.
Firms paying their CEO $1 million or more in salary are most affected. Absent a 4 Perry and Zenner (2001) examine a random sample of 200 companies and document performance measures used. They report that most companies use some form of financial performance measure, but the grandfathered contract executed prior to February 17, 1993, salary in excess of $ 1 million cannot be deducted. Firms paying their CEO less than $1 million in salary, but more than $1 million when annual cash bonuses are included are also affected. However, as discussed above, these firms have the option of qualifying their bonus plans as performance based, hence exempting this compensation from the limit on deductions. Finally, firms that pay their CEO less than $1 million in cash compensation (primarily salary and bonus), but more than $1 million when stock option grants are included are minimally affected. This is because stock options grants, as long as they are issued at or above the current market price, are considered performance-based. While the firm must qualify these plans, most can do so without changing the associated incentives or risks. In contrast, reducing salary or qualifying bonus plans can change the incentives and risks of managers. Thus, firms paying cash compensation in excess of or near to the $1 million limit are most affected and are our primary focus 5 . Similar to Rose and Wolfram (2002) , we use an ex-ante measure to identify CEOs likely to be affected by section 162(m). Rose and Wolfram (2002) argue that using current compensation or lagged compensation to define affected CEOs introduces biases, in that the researcher misses firms that have changed/reduced their compensation in response to section 162(m).
We use a fixed effects, pooled regression model similar to Perry and Zenner (2001) to test our proposition that the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of 162 (m) in affected firms will be lower and be more responsive to firm performance than the compensation of other CEOs. We adapt the model to allow for differential effects for CEOs hired after the imposition of 162(m).
measures used vary widely. 
The dependent variables are: Salary x,t, the natural log of salary of the CEO in company x for year t; Bonus x,t , the natural log of the annual bonus of the CEO in company x for year t; TCC x,t , the natural log of total cash compensation, the sum of salary and bonus of the CEO in company x for year t; ESO x,t, the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted to the CEO in company x in year t; and TDC x,t, the total direct compensation of the CEO in company x for year t.
The independent variables are:
Ln(CEO tenure x,t ) = the natural log of the number of years the CEO has been in his/her position as of year t ; Ln(Assets x,t ) = the natural log of the company's total assets in year t; Million dollar variable x,t = an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if predicted cash compensation (salary plus bonus) of the CEO in company x in any preceding year exceeds $1,000,000, and zero otherwise. Predicted cash compensation is measures are either inappropriately narrow (e.g., salary only) or too broad (e.g., total compensation).
calculated using 1992 cash compensation as the base year and adjusting it for the average increase between year t and 1992 New x,t = an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the CEO was hired after the imposition of I.R.C. section 162(m); Performance measures ROA x,t, ROA x,t-1 = net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations of company x in years t and t-1, divided by total assets; ∆Ln(Sales x,t ), ∆Ln(Sales x,t-1 ) = the change in the natural log of sales of company x in years t and t-1; Holding period returns x,t, Holding period returns x,t-1 = 1 year return to shareholders of company x in year t and t-1; and fixed effects to control for firm and year. We include CEO tenure to control for individual effects, such as experience.
According to prior research (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Lewellen et. al., 1987 ) a CEO's years as CEO are related to his or her compensation. Total assets as well as firm and year dummy variables are included to control for size and year effects.
IV. Sample and Data

Sample Selection
We use data from the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the analysis. The
ExecuComp database takes advantage of the expanded disclosures required by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1993 and provides a fairly complete array of data items.
Because less precise disclosure was required prior to 1993, it would be difficult, if not impossible to collect the same array of data for prior years. The database contains 144,108 firm year observations of executives' compensation over the period 1993 to 2004. As previously mentioned, we calculate predicted cash compensation to determine the "million dollar variable" using 1992 data. Because there is very little 1992 data in the ExecuComp database, we manually examined the proxy statements of over 1,300 firms to obtain 1992 CEO compensation data.
We eliminate all non-CEO observations and limit the observations to periods after 1994, the period after section 162(m) went into effect. We further require data be available Table 2 shows the incidence of affected firms and newly hired CEOs in the sample. Insert table 6 here   An interesting result in table 7 is the significant and positive coefficient associated with the variable, new. The result is especially interesting in light of the fact that the twoway interaction variable (new times million dollar variable) is not significant. This supports the proposition that firms make significant grants of stock options when hiring new CEOs. Table 8 shows that, across the entire sample, CEO total direct compensation is related to firm performance. The coefficients of five of the six performance measures are significant and positive. In addition, the coefficient associated with the variable, new, is positive and significant. This implies that new CEOs earn more compensation, on average, than their more seasoned counterparts. As discussed above, this may be a function of stock option grants made to CEOs early in their tenure. On the other hand, the coefficient associated with the two-way interaction, (new times the million dollar variable) is significant and negative. This is consistent with our expectation and demonstrates that the total compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m) in firms predicted to be affected is reduced relative to other CEOs. Furthermore, there is some evidence of an increase in the pay performance sensitivity for new CEOs in affected firms. Two of the three-way interactions (million dollar variable times new with lagged income (ROA) and lagged change in sales) are significant and positive.
Insert tables 7 and 8 here
VI. Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of the adoption of IRC section 162(m) on the CEO compensation package. Although section 162(m) was intended to curb CEO compensation, published survey data shows that all components of CEO compensation have increased dramatically during the period since its adoption. These surveys suggest that 162(m) has had no appreciable effect on CEO compensation. In this paper, we focus our analysis on the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m) in those firms predicted to be affected by this tax provision. We believe that focusing on the compensation of CEOs The first order variables are all one-sided, expect for new. The expected sign is + for the million dollar variable, CEO tenure, and the performance variables. There is no sign prediction for new, so it is two sided. The two-way interactions with the million dollar variable are also one sided, the expectation for all is also +. The two way interactions between new and the performance variables are two sided because we do not predict how new and unaffected affects the relation between pay and performance. The two way for new times the million dollar variable is expected to be negative. The three-way interactions (performance variables, million dollar variable, and new) are all one sided and expected to be positive. 
